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Abstract 
This study assesses the synergy effects of governance in mobile phone penetration for 
inclusive human development in Sub-Saharan Africa with data for the period 2000-2012 by 
employing a battery of interactive estimation techniques, namely: Fixed effects (FE), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Tobit regressions. Concepts of political (voice 
& accountability and political stability/no violence), economic (government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance are 
employed. The following findings are established. First, the previously apparent positive 
correlation between mobile phones and inclusive development can be extended to a positive 
effect. Second, whereas political governance is overwhelmingly not significant across 
estimated models, average effects from economic governance are higher relative to 
institutional governance. Third, on the synergy effects from interactions between mobile 
phones and governance variables, whereas none are apparent in FE regressions, there are 
significant synergy effects in GMM and Tobit estimations, notably, from: (i) regulation 
quality in the former and (ii) political stability, voice & accountability and rule of law in the 
latter. Fourth, there is consistent evidence of convergence in inclusive human development. 
Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; I10; I32; O40; P37 
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1. Introduction 
 There are at least four reasons for investigating the synergy effects of governance in 
mobile phone penetration for inclusive human development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
The terms, ‘mobile phone penetration’, ‘mobile telephony’, ‘mobile’ and ‘mobile phones’ are 
used interchangeably throughout the paper. First, the April 2015 World Bank report on 
attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed 
that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of SSA (World 
Bank, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015).  
Second, whereas high-end markets in North America, Europe and Asia are 
experiencing some degree of stabilization in the growth of mobile phones, there are still 
substantial business opportunities in developing African markets (Asongu, 2015a). Moreover, 
according to Penard et al. (2012), Africa has been experiencing an uneven development in 
mobile phone versus internet penetration. Consistent with the account, as of 2010, mobile and 
internet penetrations had reached saturation points in developed countries, whereas in Africa 
the phenomena have been characterised by an asymmetric development, notably: with 41% of 
mobile phone penetration and 9.6% of internet penetration.  
Third, government quality has been substantially documented to be associated with 
higher living standards, notably, in the: (i) improvement of quality of life by more efficient 
allocation of economic resources (Fosu, 2013ab; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor 2014), especially for 
the elderly that are deprived (Fonchingong 2014) and  (ii) consolidation of a solid foundation 
for societal change (Efobi, 2015). In essence, exclusive growth in Africa and the role of 
institutions in Africa’s growth resurgence have motivated a recent book by Fosu (2015ab) that 
is focused on assessing whether the recent growth resurgence experienced by the continent 
from the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015c, p. 44) is a myth. The notion of myth in the book 
fundamentally builds on the fact that the juice of economic prosperity has  not been trickling 
down to the poor. We aim to extend this strand of literature by examining the synergy effects 
of governance in mobile phones for inclusive development in a SSA: a sub-region with 45% 
of countries off-track from the MDG extreme poverty target.  
 Fourth, mobile phones in Africa have been established to: (i) be more associated with 
the informal economic sector, as opposed to its formal component (Asongu, 2013a) and (ii) 
mitigate income-inequality (Asongu, 2015b). This is consistent with the growing literature on 
inclusive development benefits from mobile phones, inter alia, for the: (i) empowerment of 
women (Ojo et al., 2012; Maurer, 2008); (ii) promotion of financial inclusion (Singh, 2012, p. 
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466; Kirui et al. 2013, p. 141); (iii) improvement of health services for the poor (Kliner et al., 
2013); (iv) bridging of the rural-urban divide (Chan & Jia, 2011, pp. 3-5; Qiang et al., 2011, 
pp. 14-26); (v) elimination of agricultural wastes through the mitigation of supply- and 
demand-side constraints as well as demand-supply mismatches (Muto & Yamano, 2009; Aker 
& Fafchamps, 2010); (vi) efficiency in the management of households (Al Surikhi,  2012; 
Asongu, 2014a, 2015c) and (v) enhancing of business opportunities (Ondiege, 2010, p. 11; 
Mishra & Bisht, 2013, p. 505). The above justifications are linked to the inquiry in the 
perspective that, with good governance, the growth potential of mobile phones can be 
harnessed to address the policy syndrome of exclusive human development in SSA. 
 In addition to the above justifications for the present line of inquiry, there has also 
been growing requests in scholarly circles for more research on the development outcomes of 
mobile phones, partly because the phenomenon has been cautioned not to be considered as a 
silver bullet for development (Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71; Asongu & De Moor, 2015). In 
order to investigate the synergy effects of governance in mobile phones for inclusive 
development, we articulate the three main governance categories represented by six 
indicators, namely: (i) political governance (political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability); (ii) economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality) 
and (iii) institutional governance (corruption-control and the rule of law). Political governance 
is defined as the election and replacement of political leaders. Economic governance is the 
formulation and implementation of rules that enable the delivery of public commodities. 
Institutional governance is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them. Whereas the evolving literature substantiating the need to 
unbundle governance indicators is discussed in Section 2, the relevance of such unbundling is 
to avail room for more policy implications.  
 In light of the above, the main contribution of this inquiry is to extend the existing 
literature by assessing the role of governance in the inclusive human development benefits of 
mobile phone penetration. The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. The literature 
on governance, mobile phones and inclusive development is covered in Section 2. The data 
and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 
5 concludes with implications.  
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2. Governance, mobile phones and inclusive development  
2.1  Controversial views and debates on the conception of governance  
 We engage this section in three main themes, namely: (i) definitions of the concept of 
governance; (ii) controversial views on governance measurements in mainstream literature 
and (iii) the imperative of unbundling the concept of governnce in development literature.  
 In accordance with Asongu (2015d), various definitions to the concept of governance 
have been dcoumented. For brevity and lack of space, we limit the discourse to four main 
definitions from recent literature. First, economic govenance has been defined by Dixit (2009) 
as the ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and 
taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’ (p.5). Second,  
Tusalem (2015) conceives governance as an embodiment of corruption, rule of law, political 
stability, bureaucratic effectiveness and regulatory quality. Third, according to Fukuyama 
(2013), the concept of governance can be improved by adopting four principal approaches 
through which ‘state quality’ can be understood, namely: (i) procedural measures, (ii) output 
measures; (iii) bureaucratic autonomy measures and (iii) indicators of capacity which are an 
embodiment of both resources and the degree of professionalism. Fourth, to the best of our 
knowledge, the most widely employed governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
can be classified into three main categories (see Andrés et al., 2014).  (a) Political governance 
measures the election and replacement of political leaders and is approximated by: voice and 
accountability and political stability/non-violence. (b) Economic governance is defined as the 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities and is proxied 
with regulation quality and government effectiveness. (c) Institutional governance is defined 
as the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them 
and measured by the rule of law and corruption-control.  
 In the second theme, we devote space to briefly engaging several criticisms in 
academic circles that have arisen from the use of governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). As far as we have reviewed, the most notable of these criticisms is that debate 
between the underlying authors on the one hand and ‘Andrew Schrank and Marcus Kurtz’ on 
the other hand. The debate is discussed in four streams, namely: ‘models, measures and 
mechanisms’; ‘a reply’; ‘a defense’ and ‘a rejoinder’.   
 Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) have raised doubts about the consensus that good 
governance is positively associated with economic development by presenting a case for 
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rethinking the mainstream confidence enjoyed by the governance indicators from Kaufmann 
et al. in empirical literature on the governance-growth nexus. The authors have concluded that 
the underlying governance measurements are problematic because they are clouded with a 
number of issues, inter alia: sampling adverse selection, perceptual biases and conceptual 
conflation with choices of policy.  
 Kaufmann et al. (2007a) have replied to Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) with a three point 
argument to demonstrate that the claims by Schrank and Kurtz (2007a)  are unsubstantiated. 
(i) They have first shown that claims from Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) on ‘perception-base 
measurement biases’ in the widely used governance indicators are falsifiable, speculcative 
and short of withstanding empirical scrutiny. (ii) They then provide empirical backing to 
support the argument that the short-term relationship advanced by Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) 
is statistically fragile and conceptually flawed. (iii) Lastly, the have dismissed the empirical 
study of the contenders on the effect of govenance on growth. 
 In defense of their position Kurtz and Schrank (2007b), have responded to  Kaufmann 
et al. (2007a) by further articulating that the underpinning concerns about conceptual clarity 
and corresponding measurement are deeply seated in the debate surrounding the governance-
growth relationship. Kaufmann et al. (2007b) have also responded in a brief rejoinder by 
reiterating the lack of empirical justification for the criticisms sustained by Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007b). Kaufmann et al. (2007b)  have further articulated that concerns about ‘potential 
respondant bias’ posited by Kurtz and Schrank (2007ab) also apply to other variables because, 
they are not exclusively limited to the measurement of government effectiveness. In light of 
the above, this line of inquiry shall adopt the governance concepts of Kaufmann et al. 
(2007ab, 2010). Consistent with recent literature on the need to unbundle govenance 
measurements for more development outcomes and greater subtlety in policy implication, we 
employ the six main governance indicators. 
 In the third theme, as emphasised by Asongu (2015d), the motivation for employing 
all governance indicators builds on a recent stream of literature on unbundling institutions in 
African development, notably: (i) regulation quality and government effectiveness being the 
most important indicators in stimulating innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015); (ii) corruption-
control being the most effective weapon in the fight against software piracy (Andrés & 
Asongu, 2013) and conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); (iii) the role of formal 
institutions in the promotion of knowledge economy (Andrés et al., 2014) and (iv) the 
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deterioration of governance in the prediction and timing of the Arab Spring (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2015).  
 
2.2 Mobile phones penetration and inclusive development 
In addition to easing the doing of business (Kumar &  Zahn, 2003; Kuoa & Yub, 2006; Jin & 
von Zedtwitz, 2008; Lee et al., 2010), the mobile revolution has generated a plethora of 
inclusive development benefits to developing countries. According to recent African 
development literature (Asongu & De Moor, 2015), the revolution of the mobile phone has 
touched almost every societal fabric in Africa. The narrative sustains that it has improved both 
household and corporate management by constantly consolidating networks of interaction 
which include, inter alia: (i) improved payment facilities for Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises (SMEs); (ii) enhanced business-to-business interactions; (iii) better mechanisms 
for health-care monitoring;  (iv) upgraded household-to-household as well as household-to-
business interactions; (v) reduction of development gaps between rural and urban areas and 
(vi) improved household and corporate management through continuous upgrade of networks 
of interaction.  
We briefly discuss the inclusive benefits of mobile phone penetration in three main 
themes, notably, in: enhancement of health services, reduction of the gender gap and 
mitigation of the rural/urban divide. In the first theme on health services, there is growing 
evidence that mobile phones are being used for the delivery of health services. In essence, the 
device has been instrumented to provide more affordable medical services (West, 2013). 
Therefore, income and geography constraints, formerly inhibiting ‘health care delivery’ are 
being increasingly mitigated with mobile services. Some mechanisms through which medical 
services have been improved include: laboratory tests, medical recording and access to 
material of reference. Accordingly, medical devices are growingly being adapted for, inter 
alia: better treatment and observation of tuberculosis patients (Hoffman et al., 2010); 
improved tailored feedback due to enhanced self-monitoring (Bauer et al., 2010) and efficient 
management of clinical appointments (De Costa et al., 2010). According to Kliner et al. 
(2013), communities in rural areas are benefiting most from health-oriented mobile 
applications. This position is confirmed by a study of the same year supporting the negative 
poverty externalities of mobile phone applications in rural areas:  ‘We conclude that mobile 
phone-based money transfer services in rural areas help to resolve a market failure that 
farmers face; access to financial services’ (Kirui et al., 2013, p. 141). The first strand 
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fundamentally builds on the notion that targeted spending on health services is critical to 
bridging the rural-urban gap (Ssozi & Amlani, 2015).  
The second theme documents evidence of mechanisms by which the rural-urban 
divide can be reduced, notably via: (i) tackling issues of unemployment, food production and 
distribution in rural areas; (ii) supporting SMEs and cooperatives and (iii) reducing supply- 
and demand-side constraints in agricultural productivity. Mobile phones are increasingly 
being employed to tackle challenges to employment, production and distribution of supplies 
in food.  For instance, in Ghana, a study has established that reduction of information 
asymmetry with the help of the mobile phone augments the income of traders by about 10% 
(E-agriculture, 2012, p. 6-9).  Mobile phones are being complemented with agricultural 
finance to support SMEs and cooperatives. A notable example from Perez et al. (2011, p. 316) 
is the Community Credit Enterprises (CCE) in Costa Rica through: (i) support to financially-
sustainable groups and (ii) enhancement of the sustainability of business models. In 
accordance with the engaged literature, the mobile phone is growingly being employed to 
improve living standards in rural areas by reducing demand- and supply-side constraints in 
agricultural productivity (Muto & Yamano, 2009; Aker & Fafchamps, 2010). Consistent with 
Asongu and De Moor (2015), this mitigation of constraints with better networking and 
‘matching practices’ mechanisms have improved agricultural returns for farmer in rural areas. 
 The three streams above are in line with the stance of the World Bank that mobile 
phones are imperative for agricultural and rural development (Qiang et al., 2011, pp. 14-26). 
Chan and Jia (2011) have supported this view on the benefits of mobile phones in easing 
financial access  ‘mobile banking is an ideal choice for meeting the rural financial needs’ (p. 
3) partly because of increasing ‘rates for bank transfers through mobile cell phones at 
commercial banks’ (p. 5). The positive gains from mobile telephony are more skewed towards 
underprivileged citizens in rural areas (Warren, 2007), probably because it helps to uplift 
more barriers to the purchase of goods and information acquisition. For instance, in India, the 
mobile phone is increasing financial inclusion (Singh, 2012, p. 466) in rural areas because  
‘Telecommunication infrastructure growth especially mobile phone penetration has created 
an opportunity for providing financial inclusion’ (Mishra & Bisht, 2013, p. 503).  
In the third theme, we briefly discuss some recent evidence on the reduction of the 
gender-divide. Accordingly, there is growing evidence that mobile phones empower women 
via enhanced channels of financial inclusion. These mechanisms entail improved coordination 
of female-managed SMEs as well as household activities (Asongu, 2014a). Other documented 
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activities on gender inclusion have included: cost reduction, education and multi-tasking (Al 
Surikhi, 2012; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Ondiege, 2010, 2013; Asongu, 2014a, 2015b). 
According to Asongu and De Moor (2015), government intervention is imperative for females 
to enjoy the financial inclusive rewards of mobile phones. Other studies consistent with this 
narrative have included: (i) Ojo et al. (2012) articulating the usage of mobile phones to 
enhance the livelihood of women in Ghana and (ii) Maurer (2008) sustaining the relevant role 
of policy in consolidating the gender inclusive benefits of mobile phones. We invite the 
interested reader to consult Ondiege (2010, p. 11) and Bisht (2013, p. 505) for country-
specific strategies/approaches.  
In light of the above, to the best our knowledge the available literature has not focused 
on the complementary role of governance in mobile phone penetration for inclusive 
development.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 We assess a panel of 49 SSA countries with data from African Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for the period 2000-2012. Consistent with recent African 
inclusive development literature (Asongu et al., 2015), the dependent is the inequality 
adjusted human development index (IHDI) while the mobile telephony variable is measured 
by the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people), in line with recent African knowledge 
economy literature (Tchamyou, 2015). In accordance with the justifications provided in 
Section 2, the six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are: (i) voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence for political governance; (ii) government 
effectiveness and regulation quality for economic governance; and (iii) corruption-control and 
the rule of law for institutional governance. These indicators have also been used in recent 
governance literature (see Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 2014; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016).  
 Selected control variable are: GDP per capita growth, private domestic credit, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and remittances. We expect a positive relationship between these 
covariates and inclusive human development; in line with recent inclusive growth literature 
(see Anand et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2011; Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Mlachila et al., 2014). 
In essence: (i) per capita economic growth, FDI and credit facilities are needed for ‘social 
spending’ that improves human development (Mlachila et al., 2014) while (ii) remittances 
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which are used for consumption purposes for the most part are also very likely to enhance 
human development (Mlachila et al., 2014; Ssozi & Asongu, 2015).  
 The definition and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary 
statistics in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 discloses the correlation matrix. From the 
summary statistics: (i) the means of the variables are comparable and (ii) in light of 
corresponding variations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would 
emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to avoid concerns of multicollinearity. We 
notice that concerns about degrees of substitution among variables are apparent among 
governance variables. However, consistent with the narrative in Section 2 on the need to 
unbundle governance indicators, conceptual priority takes precedence over degrees of 
substitution. To this end, we: (i) do not bundle the variables by means of principal component 
analysis and (ii) employ the six governance variables independently in distinct specifications 
to avoid concerns of multicollinearity.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 We adopt three main empirical strategies, which control for: (i) the unobserved 
heterogeneity with Fixed effects (FE) regression; (ii) persistence in the dependent variable 
with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) that increases the bite on endogeneity and 
(iii) the limited range of the dependent variable with the Tobit model.  
 The panel FE model is presented as follows: 
tiitih
h
htitititi WMGGMIHD ,,,
4
1
,3,2,10,    

   (1) 
Where: tiIHD ,  
is inclusive human development of country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
M , mobile phone penetration; G , Governance (Voice &  accountability, political stability/ 
no violence, government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and rule of law) 
; MG , interaction between mobile phone penetration (M) and Governance  (G);
 
W  is the 
vector of control variables  (GDP per capita growth, Private domestic credit, Remittances and 
Foreign direct investment);
 i

 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 Since, the estimation strategy involves interactive regressions; it is important to 
engage some pitfalls associated with these types of regressions documented by Brambor et al. 
(2006). Accordingly, all constitutive variables should enter into the specifications. Moreover, 
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for the estimations to have economic meaning, corresponding estimated parameters from 
interactive terms should be interpreted as conditional marginal impacts.  
 Consistent with Asongu (2013b), there is at least a threefold reason for adopting the 
GMM approach. Accordingly, it: (i) controls for potential endogeneity in all regressors; (ii) 
reduces potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and (iii) does not 
eliminate cross-country differences. Whereas the system GMM estimation (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has been preferred to the difference estimator (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991) as justified by Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4), we adopt the recent approach that 
employs forward orthogonal deviations. This is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) by 
Roodman (2009ab) and has been documented to account for cross-sectional independence and 
limit over-identification or instrument proliferation (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). 
In the specification, we employ a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead 
of differencing. The two-step approach is preferred to the one-step because it is consistent 
with heteroscedasticity,  
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
 tititih
h
htititititi WMGGMIHDIHD ,,,
4
1
,4,3,2,10,    

              (2)     
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)()(
)()()()(
                                                                                                                                    (3) 
Where:  represents tau and t  
is the time-specific constant.   
 
 Given that the IHDI theoretically falls between 0 and 1, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
may be inappropriate. To this end, many authors have employed double-censored Tobit 
models to control for the limited range of the dependent variable (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; 
Koetter et al., 2008; Ariss, 2010; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). In accordance with recent 
literature (McDonald, 2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010), if there are no observations of 
either 0 or 1 for the IHDI (which is the case here), estimating by a double-censored Tobit 
model is the same as estimating by a linear regression model since the two likelihood 
functions coincide. Therefore, the logistic regression associated with the Tobit model is as 
follows:  
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it
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x
IHD 





'
'
exp1
exp
                                                                                         (4)
 
where itx  is the same vector of regressors used in the Tobit model,  is the vector of 
parameters  and it is  independently and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and 
variance ² variance.  
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results 
 Table 1 below presents the FE findings for which we have controlled for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in terms of country-specific effects. The following findings can be 
established. Mobile phones consistently increase inclusive human development in SSA. 
Economic governance increases inclusive human development, albeit with the government 
effectiveness tool exerting a higher magnitude relative   to regulation quality. Only the rule of 
law dimension of institutional governance significantly increases inclusive development. The 
effect of political governance is not significant. Significant synergy effects are not apparent. 
The significant control variables have expected signs. Accordingly, we expected GDP per 
capita growth, remittances and FDI to positively affect inclusive human development.  
We have observed from FE regressions that synergy effects appreciating the 
interaction between governance and mobile phones variables are not consistently significant. 
It is important to note that the system GMM equation is tailored such that, its first difference 
equation eliminates country FE (see Eq. (3)). However, the GMM approach controls for time-
invariant omitted variables which represent some bite on endogeneity. Moreover, at least two 
conditions are necessary for the application of the GMM, notably: (i) the dependent variable 
should be persistent and (ii) the number of cross-sections should exceed the number of years 
in each time series (N>T). The latter is respected since we have 49 countries (N) and 13 years 
(T). The former also holds because the correlation between the IHDI and its first lag is 0.999, 
which is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 needed to ascertain the persistence 
of the dependent variable (Asongu & De Moor, 2016).  
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Table 1: Inclusive development and mobile phones (Fixed Effects) 
       
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
   Political 
Stability (PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability(VA)  
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
Constant  0.428*** 0.429*** 0.444*** 0.438*** 0.429*** 0.449*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.805)      
Voice & Accountability --- 0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.887)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.024** --- --- --- 
   (0.012)    
Regulation Quality --- --- ---   0.015* --- --- 
    (0.094)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.002 --- 
     (0.770)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.030*** 
      (0.001) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.00004 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.410)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.00009 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.225)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- -0.00009 --- --- --- 
   (0.237)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.00001 --- --- 
    (0.870)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.00008 --- 
     (0.240)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.00009 
      (0.899) 
GDP per capita growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Private Domestic Credit  -0.00001 -0.00002 0.000008 -0.00008 -0.000009 -0.0001 
 (0.958) (0.933) (0.981) (0.822) (0.978) (0.769) 
Remittances  0.0007* 0.0007** .0006* 0.0006* 0.0007* 0.0005 
 (0.064) (0.040) (0.071) (0.071) (0.057) (0.123) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0003* 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.054) (0.065) (0.048) (0.073) 
       
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.439 0.441 0.452 0.444 0.440 0.462 
Fisher  29.62*** 29.77*** 31.13*** 30.11*** 29.74*** 32.50*** 
Countries  39 39 39 39 39 39 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Table 2: Inclusive development and mobile phones (GMM) 
       
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability (PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability(VA) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
Constant  0.043*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.084*** 0.055*** 0.0731*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IHDI(-1) 0.843*** 0.826*** 0.829*** 0.814*** 0.794*** 0.758*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.638)      
Voice & Accountability --- 0.003* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.054)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.009*** --- --- --- 
   (0.008)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.015*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.007*** --- 
     (0.004)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.009*** 
      (0.000) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob -0.000005 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.895)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.00002 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.468)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.000009 --- --- --- 
   (0.842)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- 0.00004* --- --- 
    (0.050   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- -0.00006 --- 
     (0.161)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- -0.00002 
      (0.472) 
GDP per capita growth 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private Domestic Credit  0.0002 0.0002 0.000001 -0.0001 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.315) (0.160) (0.990) (0.374) (0.005) (0.000) 
Remittances  0.0001 0.0003* 0.000009 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0004*** 
 (0.277) (0.088) (0.955) (0.002) (0.088) (0.003) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
AR(1) (0.090) (0.087) (0.075) (0.026) (0.289) (0.352) 
AR(2) (0.621) (0.743) (0.915) (0.641) (0.973) (0.461) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.692) (0.626) (0.387) (0.231) (0.521) (0.550) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels (0.637) (0.575) (0.603) (0.645) (0.601) (0.876) 
H excluding group (0.599) (0.556) (0.274) (0.126) (0.415) (0.293) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)       
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.471) (0.297) (0.198) (0.474) (0.347) (0.122) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.787) (0.902) (0.717) (0.129) (0.678) (0.997) 
       
Fisher  358750.35*** 93951.21*** 1590000*** 134730.84*** 101114.55*** 37327.28*** 
Instruments  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 38 
Observations  261 261 261 261 261 261 
       
15 
 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for 
Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
 
In accordance with Asongu and De Moor (2016), we employ four main information 
criteria to assess the validity of corresponding models. First, the null hypothesis of the 
second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected.  Second, the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should also not be significant because their null 
hypotheses are the positions that instruments are not correlated with the error terms, implying 
they are valid. Accordingly, whereas the Sargan OIR test is not weakened by instruments and 
not robust, the Hansen OIR is weakened by instruments but robust. Third, we complement the 
Sargan OIR and Hansen OIR  tests with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity 
of instruments. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also 
provided.  
The following findings are established. There is some evidence of catch-up in 
inclusive human development because the absolute values of the lagged endogenous variables 
are consistently between 0 and 1. We invite the interested reader to refer to Fung (2009, p. 58) 
and Asongu (2013b, p. 49) for more insights into the convergence criterion. Mobile phone 
penetration consistently increases human development. With the exception of political 
stability, all governance variables have positive impacts on inclusive development. Only the 
marginal effect from regulation quality is significantly positive. All the significant control 
variables have the expected positive signs.  
 As discussed in Section 3.2, the Tobit model is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is limited. Since the IHDI varies between 0 and 1, we control for the limited range of 
the dependent variable by employing a double censored Tobit model to establish the 
following findings. Mobile phones consistently increase inclusive human development. With 
the exception of political governance from which effects are insignificant, the impacts from 
constituents of economic governance and institutional governance are positive. Positive 
synergy effects are observed from political governance (political stability and voice & 
accountability) and the rule of law. The significant control variable has the expected sign.  
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Table 3: Inclusive development and mobile phones (Tobit) 
       
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development (IHDI) 
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political 
Stability (PolS) 
Voice & 
Accountability(VA) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulation 
Quality(RQ) 
Corruption-
Control  (CC) 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
Constant  0.391*** 0.385*** 0.437*** 0.417*** 0.414*** 0.412*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile phones (Mob) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability 0.009 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.168)      
Voice & Accountability --- 0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.850)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 0.059*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- 0.057*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Corruption Control --- --- --- --- 0.042*** --- 
     (0.001)  
Rule of Law  --- --- --- --- --- 0.030*** 
      (0.009) 
‘Political Stability’×Mob 0.0005*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001)      
‘Voice & Accountability’ ×Mob --- 0.0005* --- --- --- --- 
  (0.051)     
‘Government Effectiveness’×Mob --- --- 0.0002 --- --- --- 
   (0.257)    
‘Regulation Quality’×Mob --- --- --- -0.00009 --- --- 
    (0.748)   
‘Corruption Control’ ×Mob --- --- --- --- 0.0003 --- 
     (0.196)  
‘Rule of Law’×Mob --- --- --- --- --- 0.0005** 
      (0.022) 
GDP per capita growth 0.001 0.0009 0.0002 0.001 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.360) (0.436) (0.816) (0.168) (0.389) (0.478) 
Private Domestic Credit  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005* 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.054) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) 
Remittances  0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 -0.00006 
 (0.700) (0.665) (0.823) (0.682) (0.183) (0.891) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.0005 -0.0007 0.00007 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.325) (0.224) (0.902) (0.805) (0.518) (0.545) 
       
LR Chi-Square  227.89*** 202.98*** 246.03*** 222.80*** 230.61*** 232.68*** 
Log Likelihood 360.390 347.934 369.457 357.844 361.746 362.783 
Observations  310 310 310 310 310 310 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results 
 
 This section is engaged in three main theme, namely: the effect of mobile phones, the 
impact of governance (implications for policy), synergy effects (implications for practice) and 
convergence in inclusive development (implications for theory). 
 
4.2.1 Implications for policy 
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 First, we have confirmed the positive correlation between mobile phones and inclusive 
human development in Africa previously established by Asongu (2014a, 2015b). It is 
important to note that the underlying studies have been based on cross-sectional data. Hence, 
the requirement of a positive effect for sound policy implications has been established by the 
present inquiry. As a policy implication, the mobile revolution remains a source of inclusive 
development and pro-poor growth in SSA. Hence, given that more than 45% of countries in 
the sub-region are off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target, the mobile 
phone can play a crucial role in the post-2015 development agenda if good policies are put in 
place by the governments of sampled countries in order to maximise the established inclusive 
benefits, in view of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are fundamentally 
centred on sustained inclusive development. This leads us to the second strand on the role of 
governance in these projected benefits. 
 The literature engaged in Section 2 has articulated the need for better governance 
policies in view of maximising the potential inclusive development benefits of mobile phones 
(e.g. see Maurer, 2008). Two main trends draw our attention from the findings on the effect of 
governance: (i) whereas political governance is overwhelmingly not significant across 
estimated models, (ii) average effects from economic governance on inclusive development 
are higher relative to institutional governance. We devote space to provide more insights into 
these trends. First, the fact that economic governance has the highest effect on inclusive 
development can be justified from conceptual and empirical standpoints. (1) From a 
conceptual perspective, compared to institutional and political governances, economic 
governance is by definition the most closely related governance concept to human 
development because it entails, the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public goods. These public goods embody facilities that are conceptually very close to the 
IHDI, inter alia: heath, educational and social amenities. (2) Oluwatobi et al. (2015) have 
assessed the role of governance components in stimulating innovative development in Africa 
and found economic governance to be the most effective governance mechanism. Second, the 
insignificant effect of political governance (compared to economic governance) may be 
traceable to the fact that priorities in political governance as opposed to economic governance 
engender less development rewards at the early stages of industrialisation. It is important to 
clarify the sequence of governance in the development process. In essence, according to 
recent literature, economic institutions should be prioritised over political institutions at the 
initial stages of economic development in order for governance to deliver public commodities. 
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The interested reader can find country-specific and continental evidence in Kramon (2009) 
and Anyanwu and  Erhijakpor (2014) respectively.  As a policy implication, in increasing 
order, political governance, institutional governance and economic governance are positively 
associated with inclusive human development.  
 
4.2.2 Implications for practice  
 In the third theme, we assess how the main problem statement of this line of inquiry 
has been addressed by discussing the synergy effects from interactions between the mobile 
phone and governance variables.  Whereas no significant synergy effects are apparent in FE 
regressions, there are significant synergy impacts in the GMM and Tobit estimations, notably, 
from: (i) regulation quality in the former and (ii) political stability, voice & accountability and 
the rule of law in the latter. However, consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on pitfalls of 
interactive regressions, we cannot establish policy implications exclusively on synergy 
impacts. Hence, there is need to compute net effects. (1) The net effect from regulation 
quality in GMM regressions is 0.0003714([0.00004 × -0.715] + 0.0004). (2) Net effects 
corresponding to Tobit regressions are: (i) 0.0007285 ([0.0005 × -0.543] + 0.001) for political 
stability; (ii) 0.000677([0.0005 × -0.646] + 0.001) for voice & accountability   and (iii) 
0.000679([0.0005 × -0.642] + 0.001) for the rule of law. As a policy implication, governance 
can consolidate the gains of inclusive development from mobile phones. However, the 
corresponding low net effects imply that governance standards need to be improved in order 
to accelerate the underlying inclusive gains in the post-2015 development agenda.  
 
4.2.2 Implications for theory 
 Fourth, it is important to highlight the policy relevance of convergence that is apparent 
from the GMM findings. Accordingly, we have consistently observed that the information 
criterion for convergence holds because the absolute value of the lagged endogenous variable 
is between 0 and 1. The finding is consistent with recent findings by Asongu (2014b) who has 
established evidence of convergence in the IHDI with data from 38 African countries for the 
period 1981 to 2009, albeit, the IHDI converging slower than some of its constituent 
components. The implication of the established evidence of convergence is that countries with 
lower levels of inclusive human development in SSA are catching-up their counterparts with 
higher levels of inclusive development.  This line of interpretation extends the theoretical 
underpinnings of income convergence to other fields of economic and human developments. 
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 Overall the established role of mobile phones on inclusive development is consistent 
with the engaged literature. The positive inclusive human development benefits may be 
traceable to several factors documented in the underlying literature, inter alia: efficiency in 
household management (Al Surikhi, 2012); enhancement of health services (Kliner et al., 
2013); women empowerment (Maurer, 2008; Ojo et al., 2012); promotion of financial 
inclusion (Singh, 2012, p. 466; Kirui et al. 2013, p. 141); improvement of household business 
opportunities (Ondiege, 2010, p. 11; Mishra & Bisht, 2013, p. 505); elimination of demand- 
and supply-side constraints as well as agricultural wastes (Muto & Yamano, 2009; Aker & 
Fafchamps, 2010) and bridging of the rural-urban divide (Qiang et al., 2011, pp. 14-26; Chan 
& Jia, 2011, pp. 3-5). The present inquiry has complemented this strand of literature by 
establishing that enhanced governance standards would potentially improve the inclusive 
human development benefits of mobile phones currently being enjoyed by the sampled 
countries in SSA.  
 
5. Concluding implications 
This study has assessed the synergy effects of governance in mobile phone penetration for 
inclusive human development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with data for the period 2000-
2012 by employing a battery of interactive estimation techniques, namely: Fixed effects (FE), 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Tobit regressions. Concepts of political (voice 
& accountability and political stability/no violence), economic (government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance have been 
employed. The following findings have been established.  
First, the previously apparent positive correlation between mobile phones and 
inclusive development in Africa can be extended to a positive effect in SSA. As a policy 
implication, in the post-2015 development agenda, the mobile revolution remains a relevant 
means to inclusive development and pro-poor growth in the sub-region. Second, whereas 
political governance is overwhelmingly not significant across estimated models, average 
effects from economic governance on inclusive development are higher relative to 
institutional governance. As a policy implication, in increasing order, political governance, 
institutional governance and economic governance are positively associated with inclusive 
human development.  
Third, on the synergy effects from interactions between the mobile phone and 
governance variables, whereas none are apparent in FE regressions, there are significant 
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synergy effects in the GMM and Tobit estimations, notably, from: (i) regulation quality in the 
former and (ii) political stability, voice & accountability and rule of law in the latter. As a 
policy implication, governance can consolidate the gains of inclusive development from 
mobile phones. However, the corresponding low net effects further imply that governance 
standards need to be improved in order to accelerate the underlying inclusive gains for the 
post-2015 development agenda. Fourth, there is consistent evidence of convergence in 
inclusive human development. The implication for this convergence is that countries with 
lower levels of inclusive human development in SSA are catching-up their counterparts with 
higher levels of inclusive development.  Future studies within the scope of this inquiry would 
improve the extant literature by decomposing the: (i) sub-region into fundamental 
characteristics of African development and (ii) inclusive human development index into its 
constituents in order to assess how the established findings are reflected in the fundamentals 
and constituents respectively.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definition and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
Mobile Phone  Mobile  Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
 
 
Political 
Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism”. 
 
WDI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government 
and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media” 
 
WDI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political 
pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies”. 
 
 
WDI 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
 
WDI 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests” 
 
WDI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WDI 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per Capita growth rate  
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
    
Remittance  Remit  Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Foreign 
investment 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
UNDP: United Nations Development Program. WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Inequality Adj. Human Development  0.721 3.505 0.129 0.768 485 
Mobile Phone Penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
GDP per Capita growth  2.198 5.987 -49.761 58.363 608 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.100 434 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 330) 
             
                           Governance Variables                Control Variables  Ind. 
Vble 
Dep. 
Vble 
 
PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPpcg Credit Remit FDI Mobile IHDI  
1.000 0.688 0.653 0.625 0.692 0.777 -0.011 0.279 0.032 -0.018 0.310 0.411 PolS 
 1.000 0.774 0.734 0.683 0.810 0.113 0.452 0.042 -0.010 0.318 0.361 VA 
  1.000 0.877 0.836 0.897 0.118 0.543 0.020 -0.152 0.389 0.584 GE 
   1.000 0.799 0.856 -0.0001 0.532 -0.076 -0.192 0.363 0.512 RQ 
    1.000 0.851 0.053 0.469 -0.196 -0.104 0.373 0.519 CC 
     1.000 0.070 0.471 0.079 -0.084 0.345 0.507 RL 
      1.000 0.029 0.026 0.172 0.043 0.077 GDPpcg 
       1.000 -0.095 -0.082 0.511 0.536 Credit 
        1.000 0.122 -0.056 -0.043 Remit 
         1.000 0.075 -0.026 FDI 
          1.000 0.634 Mobile 
           1.000 IHDI 
             
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. 
RL: Rule of Law.  GDPpcg : GDP per capita growth rate. Credit: Private domestic credit. Remit: Remittances. FDI: Foreign Direct 
Investment. Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. Ind. Vble: Independent Variable. 
Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable.     
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